Culture’s Backlash on Decision Making by Moelker, René
11
Primavera 2004
N.º 107 - 2.ª Série
pp. 11-35
C u l t u r e ’s  B a c k l a s h  o n
D e c i s i o n  M a k i n g
René Moelker
Professor associado de Sociologia na Royal Netherlands Military Academy.
Trabalha em Sociologia Militar, concentrando-se na sociologia de famílias militares, tecnologia militar, sociologia militar de
Norbert Elias, educação militar e o conflito da Chechnya.
Resumo
A questão colocada neste artigo é a de saber se
as lições aprendidas em Srebrenica (Unprofor)
conduziram a alteração de cultura nas relações
civis-militares. Foi estudado o processo de to-
mada de decisão para demonstrar alteração de
cultura. Foi o processo de tomada de decisão ao
tempo da Unprofor que fez prova de um choque
entre as culturas militares e civis. Depois de um
inquérito parlamentar sobre Srebrenica, proce-
dimentos de tomada de decisão considerando
desenvolvimentos foram aperfeiçoados através
da utilização de um conjunto de critérios
chamados “Toetsingskader”. Os parlamentares
usam estes critérios para questionar o governo
sobre muitos assuntos importantes relativos a
desenvolvimento. A aplicação dos critérios ao
desenvolvimento na Etiópia e Eritreia foi bas-
tante pacífica dado tratar-se de uma situação
“clássica” de manutenção da paz de primeira ge-
ração. Os critérios contidos no “Toetsingskader”
foram submetidos a uma prova mais severa no
processo de tomada de decisão respeitante à
participação na Força de Estabilização do Iraque
(SFIR) em 2003. Por um lado, o “Toetsingskader”
provou ser novamente instrumento útil para
controlo parlamentar. Provou ser um instru-
mento capaz de preencher o fosso entre a cultu-
ra política, militar e civil. Por outro lado man-
tém-se o risco de raciocínio teleológico. Os crité-
rios podem facilmente ser usados para justificar
a participação pela racionalização dos objec-
tivos de desenvolvimento e/ou ignorando ques-
tões críticas.
Abstract
The question posed in this paper is whether the
lessons learned from Srebrenica (Unprofor) have led
to culture change in civil-military relations. To
demonstrate culture change the decision making
process was studied. It was the decision making
process at the time of Unprofor that showed prove of
a clash between military and civilian cultures. After
a parliamentary inquiry into Srebrenica,
decision-making procedures regarding deployments
were improved by use of a set of criteria called the
‘Toetsingskader’. Parliamentarians use these criteria
to question the government about many important
issues regarding deployment. Applying the criteria
to the deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea went
quite smoothly, being a ‘classical’ first generation
peacekeeping situation. The criteria in the
‘Toetsingskader’ were put to a more severe test in the
decision-making process regarding participation in
the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR) in 2003. On the
one hand, the ‘Toetsingskader’ proved to be a useful
tool for parliamentary control again. It proved to be
a tool that is able to bridge the gap between military
and civilian political culture. On the other hand
there remains the risk of teleological reasoning. The
criteria can easily be used to justify participation by
rationalizing goals of the deployment and / or ignoring
critical questions.
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Disaster and decision-making
It sometimes takes a disaster to put change processes into motion and to break away
from cultural restraints. Rentes Florêncio (2000) defended this thesis in ‘After the Disaster’.
According this author, the Earthquake of Lisbon in 1755 was not only a huge disaster,
killing thousands of people, but it is also regarded as a turning point where the remnants
of mediaeval culture were superseded by modern ‘enlightenment’ culture. Science, brought
by military engineers, and a change agent embodied in the figure of Pombal were able to
rebuilt the city and at the same time to constitute a new societal order. The transformation
by Pombal was brought about by the use of persuasion, merchant money and by brute
coercion but the point Rentes Florêncio is making, is that cultural change would never have
been successful if the disaster had not taken place. One can have an evolutionary model of
change, but when change agents desire to accomplish a transformation from traditional
culture to modernity overnight, and then they need a disaster, a revolution, a major conflict
or some other kind of ‘a big bang’.
Even though Rentes Florêncio’s arguments are eloquent and erudite, his theory based
on French structuralism is perhaps a little rough. On the other hand, theorists like Norbert
Elias (but also other classic authors) also state that change comes from conflict. By studying
the network of relations (the figuration) and the tensions in these networks Elias was able
to discover the genesis of institutions like the profession of the Naval Officer1 (Moelker,
2003b). However, these change processes are often long-term civilization processes
characterized by gradual change.
Dutch political decision making practice was very much influenced by the
tensions between civilian and military culture and in fact would probably only have
changed slowly if a large scale humanitarian disaster had not occurred. The disaster
that shook up civilian and military culture and that made possible a change in decision
making was the downfall of the enclave Srebrenica in 1995 and the resulting genocide
that cost the lives of eight-thousand persons. Causes and circumstances regarding
this tragedy are complex and so is the question whether or not this event could have
been prevented. If for instance the tragedy had been called ‘genocide’ from the beginning
on, things might have been different. Rijsdijk (2003) claims that the international community
1 Elias’ ‘Study into the Genesis of the Naval Profession’ is a forgotten and ‘lost’ classic of military sociology.
It was only recently rediscovered by researching the archives in Marbach/Germany where the legacy of
Elias’ works is kept on file.
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would have been forced to take responsibility. And this aspect of ‘interpretation’ or
‘semantics’ is only one of the complexities in the Srebrenica case. At the risk of simplifying
things the analysis in this chapter is limited to political decision making for political
decision making, hampered by tensions between civilian and military cultures, was
very much at the root of this evil that befell the Moslem population and the Dutch
peacekeepers.
The downfall of Srebrenica had many consequences. In this chapter only the changes
in political decision-making culture are considered for the focus is not on Srebrenica as
such but on cultural dimensions of civil-military relations in democratic societies. Therefore
not only decision-making regarding Srebrenica will be dealt with. Much attention will be
given to after-Srebrenica decision-making, meaning in particular a discussion of the cases
Ethiopia-Eritrea and Iraq. The chapter ventures into the question whether the lessons
learned from Srebrenica have been applied to these cases and whether these lessons have
led to culture change in civil-military relations. The questions to be answered in subsequent
sections are:
• What are the tensions between civilian and military culture that might possibly
influence decision-making?
• How did decision-making regarding the ‘safe’ – area Srebrenica result into the bad
ending of this Peace Support Operation?
• How did compromising between civilian and military culture result into improved
decision-making practices? The case of Ethiopia-Eritrea will illustrate how the
lessons learned from Srebrenica have been put into practice.
• How did politicians and the military proceed their decision-making practices in the
most recent of times: the case of Iraq?
Conclusions will be drawn in the last section.
Tensions in civilian and military culture
Dutch culture in general is not very much militaristic. The Netherlands armed forces
were at the peak of their power in the seventeenth century when the Netherlands Navy
gained maritime supremacy and the land forces could withstand the Spaniards and the
French. Partly because of the divergence between the civilian political culture and the
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military culture, the glory days of the Dutch Republic did not last long. The most important
power elite was the merchant class and thus the armed forces served mainly to protect
merchant interests. Merchant values became more dominant than military traditions.
Centralism was weak during the period of the republic (17th – 18th century). Governance
in the Republic is often characterized as particularism. In this political system power is
shared by many stakeholders meaning that they will have to negotiate to reach at
consensus based policy decisions.
Perhaps this historical background is responsible for one of the most profound cultural
traits of the Dutch; they try to reach consensus by consultation, meetings, negotiation,
talking, talking, talking. As an economic system from the seventies to present day, this
culture has become famous by the names ‘Polder-model’ or ‘Rhineland-model’. These
cultural traits are also responsible for tensions between Dutch and German soldiers in the
1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. When the Dutch military collaborate with German soldiers
as they do in the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps, the Germans observe that the Dutch do
not attend meetings to make decisions. They attend meetings for brainstorming purposes.
To the astonishment of the Germans decisions might very well be reversed at the next
meeting (Moelker and Soeters, 2003c). Germans also observe characteristics that are
common to general civilian Dutch culture, i.e. the Dutch are informal, behave in an
egalitarian way, are often laid back and tend to come to solutions by improvising.
Normally the collaboration of the Dutch with the Germans is satisfactorily. Soldiers from
the two nations can work together smoothly and both nations share views on
professionalism. There is one exception to this smooth collaboration and this exception
relates to those situations where the Dutch are in a minority position. The Dutch seem to
have trouble accepting a non-equal – subordinate – role in a working relationship (Soeters
and Moelker, 2003).
Dutch politicians and the military share the same cultural values, but at the same time
there are some remarkable differences that probably come with differences in the tasks of
the two groups. Maybe the differences also come from socialization. Cadets are socialized
in traditional military values like courage, patriotism, chivalry (Moelker, 2003b) that are
not common any more in civil society. It goes without saying that the differences may lead
to tensions between the two groups. The differences and tensions are compared with each
other in table 1.
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As one can conclude from the table above the tensions between civilian and military
culture are very much related to decision-making. At first sight one might think that
the problems arising from these tensions could be avoided by following a divergent
model of decision-making. Divergent decision-making ‘is aimed at the maximization
of professionalism within the military by separating political and military decision-
-making. The political leaders formulate the goals and some broad conditions for
military operations and the military commanders carry out the military operations. The
political leaders do not interfere in military operations, while the military commanders
do not influence policy’ (Born, 2003a: 155). But the divergent model does not provide
the solution. When the differences between civilian and military culture are considered
more closely, we cannot but conclude that the tensions between the two groups of
stakeholders are structural in character and ask for structural solutions. Structurally
the interests and values of politicians and military differ and contradict. Divergent
decision-making is nothing more than a normative imperative (it describes how
decision-making should be), but it does not reflect reality. In reality decision-making
is intertwined. Politicians and the military mutually influence each other in their
decision-making. Politicians cannot decide without the expert opinions of the military
and the military cannot engage in action without considering the political consequences.
Tensions
1. Possible deployment
armed forces in a crisis
2. How much force/violence
to be used
3. Control over operations
4. Clarity of the assignment
Civilian political culture
Politicians are driven by idealism,
political opportunism, political
compromise; ‘Gesinnungsethik’
(ethic of intentions)
Clear restrictions as limited as
possible
Politicians want much control
over the execution of operations
because of the political
implications of military action
Mostly vague and
multi-interpretable goals, non
specified end states because of
necessary political compromising
Military culture
Reserved and even distant,
motivated by feasibility and
effectivity; ‘Verantwortungsethik’
(ethic of responsibility)
Preferably swift and decisive use
of force, at any case the military
strive for military superiority
Military prefer as much
autonomy as possible in the
execution of their tasks
Preference for a clear and
unambiguous mandate and
clearly defined goals and end
states
Table 1: Differences and tensions between political and military culture in the
Netherlands regarding decision-making (adapted from Born and Metselaar, 2003b: 87).
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Sam Sarkesian (1981) states that ‘the generally accepted idea of acceptance of the military
in democratic societies as an apolitical organization, characterized by civilian control and
supremacy is, in practice, mere ignorance of history and reality’.
When politicians and the military influence each other mutually then decision-making
is intertwined or convergent. ‘It is not realistic to make a distinction between policy and
implementation or between government and administration. The reason is that during
military operations, and especially peace missions, military commanders have to make
many military decisions with political implications’ (Born, 2003a: 156). Perhaps it is wiser
to search for complementary roles of the political and military leaders than to separate
politics from military affairs. A decision-making tool containing criteria for deployment
may be of assistance in this search for complementarities. Before discussing this tool in
section four, first a situation in which the tensions between civilian political culture and
military culture led to humanitarian disaster is dealt with.
Decision-making and Srebrenica
In the decision-making process prior to the downfall of Srebrenica, or more correctly
the decision-making leading to the Netherlands participation in United Nation Protection
Force (Unprofor), the interests of the stakeholders were very much intertwined (Hüttig et
al, 1998). The analysis of the decision-making process is complex and complicated for there
were many different stakeholders within the political realm. In the military realm there
were also many different and opposing interests. The data presented here come from an
official rapport by a multidisciplinary team of researchers (NIOD, 2002) and from a
parliamentary inquiry (Bakker, 2003). To analyze the complexities and to rearrange the
data the ideal type described in table 1 is used.
The first tension between civilian political culture and military culture relates to the
motives behind decisions to deploy forces in crisis area. The decision to participate in
peacekeeping in Bosnia was very much motivated by idealism on the side of the politicians.
Public opinion in the Netherlands (and also world opinion) was very much involved and
driven by the events in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992. Tidings of war, bomb attacks and sniper
actions from Sarajevo made it into the newspaper headlines almost every day. In august
1992 images and news of ‘concentration camps’ (Omarska) influenced public opinion and
politicians. A photograph of a malnutritioned man behind barbwire became an icon of the
worsening humanitarian situation.
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Politicians from the left felt it to be unacceptable that things like this happened one and
a half-hour flying from Amsterdam (Bakker, 2003: 27). Lower House spokesmen of Foreign
Affairs De Hoop Scheffer (the present Secretary-General of NATO) stated the ‘humanitarian
imperative’ to be one of the most important motives for intervention. Liberals in the
Netherlands also mentioned the importance of the Netherlands playing a role in the world
(Bakker, 2003: 29). Regarding this point De Hoop Scheffer remarked that more countries
felt like the Dutch, but the Dutch were among the most active agents in the international
debate on Bosnia. When asked whether intervention served a specific Dutch interest De
Hoop Scheffer confirmed to the parliamentary inquiry commission that the arguments on
which the Dutch government founded its decision to deploy its military in Bosnia would
be relevant even in the present day. Herewith he confirmed that violation of humanitarian
and international rule of law is always of concern to the government. Prime Minister
Lubbers added to the arguments the credibility of international rule of law (Bakker, 2003:
31). Regarding the feasibility of the operation some of the politicians were critical. Some
of them realized that peace couldn’t be enforced by the safe area approach. Some thought
the safe areas to be a ‘temporary humanitarian concept’. The Minister of Defense Ter Beek
viewed the concept as a temporary solution born out of a situation of emergency that could
serve until a definite peace arrangement would be found (Bakker, 2003: 36-37).
The military were certainly sensitive to the humanitarian arguments. They might even
have felt a bit surprised for the most outspoken activists advocating military intervention
were from the peace movement. Inside the military there were two main groups of
stakeholders. The first was in favor of deploying the newly established Airmobile Brigade
to show it off. As the army was facing downsizing and reorganization one of the new
features was to be a new ‘elite’ of soldiers, the Airmobile Brigade. Generals Reitsma and
Brinkman were eager to demonstrate that their men were up to the task while in fact
reorganization, the process of postponing conscription and transforming into an
all-volunteer force, acquirement of equipment, educating and training the soldiers had
only just begun. The more cautious Generals Van Der Vlis (Joint Chief of Staff) and General
Couzy (Army commander) represented the second group of stakeholders. They used many
arguments against the mission in Bosnia. According to Couzy troops were not available in
May 1993 because of the conscript system that was still in use at this time. Conscripts were
not deployable in peace enforcing operations. According to Couzy the most important
objection ‘concerned the fact that the units that were to be deployed would have to be
manned with volunteers from the conscript army, and also, the Airmobile Brigade (who
would have to do the job) was not trained to operate as armored infantry’ (Bakker, 2003:
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49). But the generals also pointed at general problems of feasibility regarding the safe area
concept. Though higher in rank this second group of cautious stakeholders, who emphasized
feasibility, were not successful in influencing the decision making process. During an
absence of this second group in summer 1993, members of the first group of stakeholders
wrote a recommendation to the Minister of Defense suggesting the deployment of a
logistical unit and a battalion of the Airmobile Brigade (Bakker, 2003: 50).
In the motives for deployment ethics play a major role. According to Max Weber (cited
in NIOD, 2002: 185-186) there are two kinds of ethic at stake: ‘Gesinnungsethik’ and
‘Verantwortungsethik’. People that act on ‘Gesinnungsethik’ (ethic of intentions) do not
take the consequences of their decisions or actions into consideration. They act on good
intentions. ‘Verantworungsethik’ (ethic of responsibility) on the other hand is based on the
consequences of actions, for people who act will in the end have to carry responsibility and
will be asked for justification of their actions. Among the politicians ‘Gesinnungsethik’ had
the upper hand. Ethics that are driven by good intentions and the wish to intervene in
order to address humanitarian necessity were dominant, whereas among the military a
large group of persons was inclined to look at the consequences of possible outcomes of
decisions. This conclusion not only coincidences with the cultural differences described
above. It is also logical from the military profession point of view: military professionals
are the most informed on the possibilities and the limitations of military intervention. One
cannot escape the impression that the politicians did not want to hear the objections from
the military expert point of view.
The second tension involved the question of the amount of force or violence that might
be used. The UN-resolution 836 (4 June 1993) assigns United Nations Protection Force
(Unprofor) to deter attacks against the safe areas, and allows Unprofor to use force in acts
of self defense. The resolution stated clearly that this was to be achieved ‘through the use
of air power’ (Bakker, 2003: 65). To reach these goals the number of soldiers were estimated
at 34000 for Bosnia, but as these troops were not easily available the UN settled for
7600 personnel to ‘deter by presence’. The Dutch sent a small battalion of about
400 personnel to the safe area Srebrenica (and there were even less in the enclave in 1995).
Prior to deployment Dutch politicians discussed the matter of armament and for a number
of reasons decided to send a lightly armed battalion equipped with armored cars and
.50 machine guns. The standard .25 cannon was removed in order not to provoke the Serbs
by an overly militaristic show of force. The objective was to use force only for self-protection.
Other countries had sent personnel with heavier equipment without the UN objecting.
UN-commander Briquemont would have been in favor of heavier armament and regretted
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not being able to convince the Dutch authorities (NIOD, 2002: 1124). The argument not to
provoke the Serbs must have been an interpretation of the resolution by Dutch politicians.
In fact, the Dutch were applying principles of classic first generation peace keeping (where
there is a treaty, where there is consent from both conflict parties and where impartiality
is paired to light armament) in a situation where peace enforcement is required.
This decision to send light-armed troops was discussed in the media and it was heavily
criticized by the three-star general that commanded the Netherlands army. General
Couzy2 stated that it was ‘madness’ to deploy military to places where they cannot defend
the local people they are assigned to protect (Hüttig, Peek, Wester, 1998). Joint Chief of
Staff Van der Vlis confirmed this view later during the parliamentary inquiry on Srebrenica
‘I already told you that you cannot protect the population without defending the safe area’
(Bakker, 2003: 71). Regarding the use of force tensions between civilian and military
culture are difficult to bridge: civilian politicians tend to restrict the military to the
minimum use of force whereas the military claim that they cannot do their job if they have
no means to gain superiority. In Srebrenica air power would have been the only military
tool to make a difference.
The third tension is about political control versus professional autonomy. Because of
political implications and the fact that the final responsibility rests with the Minister of
Defense there is a tendency towards micromanagement. When the enclave Srebrenica was
under attack in 1995 and things really started to look bad the Minister of Defense (at that
moment Joris Voorhoeve) was to be found at the Crisis Center of the Operational Staff in
the Netherlands, the Dutch center of operational decision making. On the other hand,
when analyzing the point of view of the military the tension stems from a lack of
autonomy. Autonomy was low. The points related to autonomy, some of which were
already discussed, can be summarized as follows:
• Srebrenica lies low and is therefore an easy target;
• Armament was adequate for protection of individual soldiers, not for warding off
a brigade size, fully armed, attack;
2 In civil-military and political-military relations it is highly uncommon for a general in active service to
express his views in the newspapers, but this general Couzy did so. By doing so, he may have distorted
relations with his political supreme commander, the Minister of Defense Ter Beek. Ter Beek called him a
‘lastpak generaal’ … a trouble general. Proof of a bad working relationship came from the parliamentary
inquiry, but also from auto biographies of Couzy and Ter Beek. One can wonder whether Couzy could have
exercised more influence if the working relationship was better. The fact remains that other objecting
generals were likewise unable to influence the stakeholders in favor of deployment.
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• Troop sizes were insufficient (circa a half battalion) to protect some 40.000 Muslim
inhabitants and refugees;
• Supplies, munitions, troops were not replenished; in fact the soldiers were more
or less hostages of the Serbian troops that controlled roads and possibilities
for transportation; this situation led to physical but also psychological dependence
on Serbian troops, some analysts have even suggested that this situation could have
promoted a form of ‘Stockholm-syndrome’ (hostages develop sympathetic attitudes
towards their hostage-taker);
• Fighting power depended on close air support (the use of which was dependent on
political decision making by UN, NATO and more than one national government);
• Because safety was to be provided by air power, there was no exit strategy. The
soldiers and the inhabitants/refugees of Srebrenica were trapped and could not get
out.
Regarding the fourth tension, the clarity of the assignment, politicians accepted
ambiguity just to keep the peace process on going. For this reason politicians regarded the
‘safe areas’ as a temporary humanitarian concept. It was not regarded a good solution, but
viewed as something that was better than ethnic cleansing and violence. Un-clarity
regarding the use of force, the mandate and the Rules Of Engagement have already been
discussed above. The soldiers were supposed to protect the population without defending
the enclave. The use of force depended on air power that was not delivered. Idealism drove
the politicians into sending soldiers without clear goals, end states or mandates.
But there was no consensus within the military. General Brinkman stated to have
understood from a Canadian commander that Srebrenica is ‘a difficult, but not impossible
assignment’ (Bakker, 2003: 54). His higher ranking colleagues had more doubts regarding
the assignment. Joint Chief of Staff Van der Vlis and Army commander Couzy criticized
the decision making process by pointing at the lacking long term goals and end states in
former Yugoslavia. At the moment of decision making Van der Vlis had no trust in a future
peace treaty ‘in 1993 I never believed that there would be an arrangement for peace’
(Bakker, 2003: 48).
Harsh words from Couzy were directed at the ambiguity of the mandate: ‘everybody
talked about us coming to the aid of the refugees, but we knew that, if it would come to
that in the end, we would have to leave those people, that we did not offer real protection.
I think that you cannot bring soldiers into such an unclear, ambiguous situation…’ Couzy
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added a few examples to illustrate his point ‘… When there is an accident with civilian
vehicles, it was forbidden that UN soldiers would bring the victims to a hospital, because
then they would be involved. There would be financial claims. … You cannot imagine
bringing soldiers in situations like these’ (Bakker, 2003: 49).
There were more forms of un-clarity besides the one regarding the assignment.
Un-clarity regarding the duration of the mission arose because of bad coordination
between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister of Defense
Ter Beek proposed the duration of deployment to be 18 months. Protocol requires that this
information is send to the UN by Foreign Affairs. This information never reached the UN,
letting the UN to believe that the Dutch committed themselves for an indefinite time
(Bakker, 2003: 78).
Bridging the cultural gap regarding decision-making: Ethiopia and Eritrea
In establishing the appropriate level of force to be used there is often a dilemma.
Opting for a too high level of force could infringe on the trust local parties have in the
intervening forces. A too low level of force may lead to the situation where intervening
forces are not able to protect and defend themselves nor the local non-combatant population.
The tensions between civilian political culture and military culture – regarding the
motivation / rationale for participating in missions, the use of force, the desire for
controlling the operations and the clarity of the assignment – form a gap that needs to be
bridged in order to prevent ethical dilemmas connected with the choice for too much or too
little force. The dilemmas must be solved before they, as was the case in Srebrenica, end
in catastrophe. To solve the dilemmas and to bridge the differences between civilian-political
culture and military culture decision-making process on sending troops abroad should rest
on the principle of a priori approval. The implication of a priori approval is that parliament
exercises a strong form of control over its military. This form of control is formalized in the
Netherlands constitution article 100 (Wecke, 2000: 272). This article states that the Lower
House has to be informed even before an informal offer is made to UN or any other
international organization. On many points the decision-making procedure was improved.
One of the main points being a risk analysis. An other point relates to guarantees for
exit strategies. In the decision-making procedure military experts are consulted. Figure 1
gives the decision-making procedure as interpreted in the Army Doctrine Publication –
III (ADP-III, 1999).
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Figure 1: Decision making on national level (ADP-III, 1999: 132)
The main instrument for decision making used by the government (and, albeit at a later
stage, by the Lower House) is the so-called ‘Toetsingskader’. This is a list of criteria which
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was presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to the Lower House in 1995
and was improved in 2001. The ‘Toetsingskader’ is used to provide a better structure for
the consultations between the government and parliament and to improve the quality of
the decision-making. The ‘Toetsingskader’ acknowledges that decision-making is an
intertwined and convergent process that improves quality by inputs from civilian
stakeholders and civilian and military experts. It enables a priori parliamentary control. A
list for use by parliamentarians in other countries is given by Born (2003c: 125). This list
with criteria for sending troops on humanitarian missions abroad corresponds to the Dutch
‘Toetsingskader 2001’3 which comprises the following points:
1. Rationale for participating / intervention: maintenance or advancement of
international law and order;
2. Clear mandate in accordance with international law;
3. Participating countries: finding a balance between military efficiency and the
desirability to involve as many possible countries into the operation;
4. Influence: The Netherlands as troop supplier must be able to influence the mandate,
the enforcement of the mandate and the duration of the commitment;
5. Feasibility of the mission: what is the point of view of the warring parties towards
intervention, which courses of action are open, what military capabilities are
required, what are the rules of engagement, structure of command, what are
possible risks;
6. Appropriateness and availability: Dutch contributions must fit into the composition,
character and mission of the multinational coalition / forces;
7. The expected duration of the operation and the criteria to be met for its prolongation
in case of need;
8. Budgetary implications: the decision by government comprises an indication of the
costs involved.
In 2000 the Netherlands government had the opportunity to put the improved decision
making process to the test4. The Dutch participated in a classic peace keeping operation in
3 Source: Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense to the members of the lower
house (tweede kamer), 19-07-2001.
4 Of course, in 2000 the 1995 criteria for decision making were used. Though there are differences, these
criteria correspond in essence to the improved criteria that were put forward in 2001.
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Ethiopia-Eritrea meant to preserve a cease-fire between the two warring nations. In a
particular border area, where frontiers were contested, a battalion of mainly Royal Marines
were to observe this cease fire. Never before was participation in UN peacekeeping
discussed so thoroughly (Wecke, 2000). In a leaflet counting twenty-two pages a very
detailed justification regarding the arguments for participation was given. This letter from
government to parliament stated that government had decided to positively answer the
UN-Secretary-Generals request for troops and then went on explaining why. Government
had not informed the Lower House in an early stage, for this would have implied that
parliament would already give consent at this time and would have complicated the
controlling task of parliament.
Risks were a very important topic of discussion. Risk analysis was based on information
from the Military Information Services, but also from a scouting mission by military
experts. Some parties in parliament especially stressed the point of security and risk.
Discussions in parliament led to a compromise. A detachment of four Apache helicopters
was stationed in Djibouti, 600 kilometers from the border where the Marines had their
compound. This decision was later criticized for if the Marines really would have gotten
in trouble, the chances that the Apaches could have come to their rescue would have been
very much dependent on flying conditions in mountainous areas.
Other points from the ‘Toetsingskader’ were clearly considered in the letter to parliament
and in the political discussion. A positive thing was that participation was based on a UN
security council resolution. The multi-national character of the peace keeping mission
guaranteed spread of responsibility, risks and burden sharing. Regarding the clarity of the
assignment the letter to parliament states that the operational assignment was ‘clear,
feasible and attainable’. But the critics of the government pointed at the possible refugee
problem. Refugees should be taken care of by refugee organizations and should not be part
of the task of the military as a monitoring force. The availability of troops, one of the
problems during Unprofor/Srebrenica, was no longer a difficulty. Training, equipment
and experience of the Marines suffices for the task. Availability of Chinook helicopters and
a troop ship accounted for the exit strategy. Command structures were clear; the UN is the
sole organization responsible for the factual implementation and execution of the peace
operation. At the same time the Dutch were in full command over their own soldiers,
meaning that in the worst case they could decide on action themselves. Rules of engagement
should be unambiguous and enable ‘robust’ action if necessary. Armament comprised
mortars, armored Patria vehicles, Stinger rocket launchers, and personal weapons (Diemaco
gun). Even though the mission was not an UN-chapter seven operation, the government
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stated that they were claiming the right to self-protection. Even the financial aspects of the
mission were dealt with in the to letter parliament.
The conclusion is that the criteria for sending soldiers on a peace-keeping mission
were dealt with satisfactorily. The largest party in the opposition was against, as was the
union for the military. Small religious and socialist opposition parties were against
deployment as well. But the societal support and the political support from the other
parties was large enough to decide in favor of sending troops. Dutch population clearly
supports peace operations as these operations contribute to human rights and international
rule of law.
In retrospect it can only be said that the mission went rather well. The contribution
that the Netherlands government wanted to make to the peace process was made. Minor
detail was that the armed forces were criticized for not working together smoothly.
Especially the logistical side of the operation proved to be expensive due to not using
the resources of Air Force, Army and Navy in joint manner. Apart from this detail:
the decision-making process had improved.
Putting the decision-making procedure to the test: Iraq
Was the decision-making procedure really tested in deciding on peacekeeping in
Ethiopia and Eritrea? The mission concerned a classical first generation peace keeping
operation and one can argue that the criteria of the ‘Toetsingskader’ were easily met
because of the nature of these kinds of operations. There was a treaty, there was consent
from both warring parties, armaments did not serve a peace enforcing operation but a
monitoring situation, impartiality was easily accomplished. During the time of the mission
there was no ‘mission creep’, meaning that the situation did not evolve from peace keeping
to peace enforcing.
The ‘Toetsingskader’ was put to a much more heavier test in the case of Iraq in 2003.
In Iraq there is a post-conflict situation which requires peace enforcing combined with
civil-military nation-building. Consent is ambiguous. Impartiality is difficult; participating
in peace enforcing operations in Iraq could easily be interpreted as taking sides with the
United States, the United Kingdom and with the amorphous anti Saddam Hussein groups
in Iraq. This situation is risky as is demonstrated by the very regular attacks on American
and European troops. Even Non Governmental Organizations like the Red Cross and
civilian UN employees are not safe from assaults and violence.
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On six June 2003 government decided to send troops to participate in the Stabilization
Force Iraq (SFIR). Now some 1.100 personnel are stationed in southern Iraq in the UK
sector. The decision making process and the letter from the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed the criteria put down in the ‘Toetsingskader’ almost
to the letter, giving information regarding all the criteria. Even though this letter was
carefully produced it provoked 159 questions from parliament that had to be answered5.
The amount of questions probably reflects public opinion. Public opinion on the war in
Iraq is divided; to the question whether the Netherlands’ military should participate even
when it could cost lives of Dutch soldiers the Dutch answered around 70% positive
regarding Kosovo, the war against terrorism, or Afghanistan, but regarding the mission in
Iraq support dropped to 43%. 46% of the Dutch public opinion is against participation if
it could cost lives of soldiers6. The peace movement was very critical towards the decision
to deploy troops in Iraq7.
5 http://www.planet.nl/planet/show/id=85106/contentid=427347/sc=885cb4 (Dutch government agrees
with sending troops to Iraq; accessed 4-1-2004).
6 http://www.smk.nl/opinh.html (see slide 4, accessed 4-1-2004).
7 http://vredessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform1206.html (anti war in Iraq site by a Dutch peace
movement; questions on the decision to send troops by this peacemovent; accessed 4-1-2004).
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Table 2: Criteria in the ‘Toetsingskader’ justifying participation in SFIR
and some of the questions they provoke
Criteria
1. Rationale for participating/
/intervention
2. Clear mandate
3. Participating countries
4. Influence
Arguments by government in
favor of participation in SFIR
• Safety, maintaining territorial
integrity and stability are precon-
ditions for humanitarian assis-
tance and rebuilding Iraq.
• Until a representative and legi-
timate government is installed,
there is a need for a multinational
stabilization force.
• The UN resolution 1483 stipu-
lates that participating countries
are not occupying forces.
• The juridical foundation for
deployment is given by UN
resolution 1482. Section 5 of this
resolution calls upon partici-
pating nations to comply with
the Geneva Convention. There is
a difference between ‘occupying
countries’ (US, UK) and ‘non-
-occupying’ countries.
• The most part of SFIR will consist
of US and UK troops. Other
participants are Denmark, Italy,
Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Slovakia, Czech republic,
Rumania, Ukraine, Norway,
Hungary. Other countries might
be interested in joining.
• It is important that the suppliers
of troops are involved in general
political military policy making.
In the British sector a ‘Committee
of Contributors’ enables con-
sultation between represen-
tatives of governments.
Some critical questions8
• Is not safety and stability threate-
ned by the presence of occupying
powers? Incidents prove that the
war is not over yet.
• Does the Dutch government know
when an Iraqi government is
installed?
• From the perspective of the
population all foreign troops are
part of the American and British
contingents and thus they are an
occupying force.
• What are the practical conse-
quences the difference between
‘occupants’ and ‘non-occupants’?
• What is the content of this political
military policy making?
8 Questions were derived from a critical analysis by the peace movement, see note 7.
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Criteria
5. Feasibility
Arguments by government in
favor of participation in SFIR
• Ethnic and religious differences
could give rise to difficulties.
Shiite population is active in
installing government officials.
Local leader come from tribes as
well as from religious groupings.
• Weather and terrain ask for
additional medication etc to
prevent health risks.
• The military assignment is direc-
ted at restoring and maintaining
safety and stability, enabling
activities of humanitarian orga-
nizations, enabling infrastructure
(water, electricity and so on),
dismantling locations related to
weapons of mass destruction,
removing the remnants of the
old Hussein regime, restoring
public order, secure police
stations, financial and cultural
buildings / institutions.
• Although the Rules of Enga-
gement are not definite yet (and
the Netherlands are supposed to
use the same ROE as those of the
lead nation, the UK, the
government strives them to be
robust, implicating possibilities
for force protection.
• Operations are under command
of US CENTCOM. The UK is
leading in the south of Iraq. The
Netherlands are in ‘full command’
over Dutch soldiers. If necessary
MoD will give directions.
• Concerning risks: safety si-
tuation in the south of Iraq is
characterized as stable … but the
situation could suddenly worsen.
Some critical questions8
• Which Shiite organization is
involved? Which groups, which
leaders?
• According to UNEP, there is 1100
tons of depleted uranium used in
munitions. Has the US informed
the Dutch where concentrations
of depleted uranium can be
found?
• Are UN inspections involved in
dismantling locations related to
weapons of mass destruction?
• Are the Rules of Engagement the
same as those of the Americans?
• Are other departments involved
in the ‘full command’ of the
Netherlands over its own mili-
tary? (interdepartmental collabo-
ration was cause of earlier
problems during Unprofor.)
• Under which conditions could
safety conditions worsen in the
south of Iraq?
• In Samarra, Hit, Falluja, Tikrit and
Bagdat the situation is not quiet.
More Americans have died after
the official end of the war then
during the war. Civilian UN-
-employees, NGO’s, and military
from Italy, Spain and other
countries have suffered losses. In
Basra (the UK sector) governance
is temporarily taken over by the
British.
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Government answered all of the 159 questions, and some six months later (six
december 2003) when parliament was consulted to decide on the question of prolonging
the mission for another six months government answered 185 questions. Risk management
was again one of the most important topics. At the end of 2003, begin 2004, Iraq is not very
stable and incidents, shooting, etceteras, appear on regular basis. Some 70 Special Forces
(green berets) were added to the battalion to provide extra security.
But contributing to the rule of law is not easy. Training Iraqi police officers led to
hilarious footage on Dutch television. Dutch policemen were training Iraqi future policemen
and instructing them at some local post. When the Dutch instructors left the site, the Iraqi
– in front of Dutch television, left their post immediately, forgetting all they had learned
that day.
Criteria
6. Appropriateness and avai-
lability
7. The expected duration, pre-
mature ending and exit
strategy
8. Budgetary implications
Arguments by government in
favor of participation in SFIR
• The Netherlands government has
units that are available and
appropriate to the task of parti-
cipation in SFIR. It concerns a
total of 1100 soldiers.
• NL participation is for a period
of six months. Prolongation for
another six months requires a
separate decision by the minis-
terial board of the government
and renewed consultation with
parliament.
• Premature ending of the mission
is possible when the political
process is disturbed and the
formation of an Iraqi government
is made impossible.
• ‘Extraction’ (meaning exit stra-
tegy) is the responsibility of the
UK.
• Estimation of additional costs
can only be provisional. The esti-
mation is circa 65 million euros.
These additional costs will be
paid from the HGIS-budget.
Some critical questions8
• What are the criteria? When is the
political process disturbed and the
formation of a Iraqi government
impossible?
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The critical questions pointed at possible difficulties. Some of these difficulties proved
reality. On 27 December 2003 a Dutch sergeant-major supposedly shot an Iraqi man who
was looting a container that had fallen from a convoy. Maybe the Dutch soldiers felt
threatened by the group of 70 looters. Warning shots did not suffice to scare the looters
away. The Dutch soldier was arrested and returned to the Netherlands to face criminal
investigation (if the facts turn out to be true, he could be accused of murder or manslaughter).
The investigation will take its time (in the mean while the soldier was released and is
awaiting the investigation), but the societal and political discussion regarding this matter
is already one of the major topics in the newspapers’ front-pages. Members of parliament
have asked the government whether the rules of engagement are sufficiently clear. The
department of justice was criticized for proceeding as quickly as they did. The Prime
Minister visited the troops in Iraq to ease them and to assure them that their job is valued
very highly. Meanwhile these troops are demoralized: when they shoot in the line of duty
they have imprisonment by their own juridical system to fear.
The shooting incident proves again that South Iraq is not stable yet, and it also proves
that it is a good thing that parliamentarians are able to question the rules of engagement.
Parliamentary control contributes to the improvement of these tools of peacekeeping /
/ peace enforcement.
Conclusion: risk of teleological reasoning
The question posed in this chapter was whether the lessons learned from
Srebrenica have led to culture change in civil-military relations. Just like an earthquake
Srebrenica made Dutch society shake and tremble. People felt responsible for the death
of so many innocent victims. The survivors are still grieving over their relatives. Many
of the soldiers involved are traumatized and still suffer from the lack of societal recognition.
In April 2002 shortly after publication of the NIOD-report, government fell because
of Srebrenica.
In this chapter the decision making process was studied. It was the decision making
process at the time of Unprofor that showed prove of a clash between military and civilian
cultures. Politicians were indeed driven by good intentions, whilst a large proportion of
the military was more cautious. Government wished to limit the use of force, whereas the
military preferred armament that would enable them to do ‘robust’ peacekeeping. Politicians
wanted much control over operations. The military wanted autonomy. But conditions for
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professional autonomy in Srebrenica were poor. Unclear mandates, assignments and rules
of engagement might at some point be useful to continue the political dialogue, but
they were devastating to the mission of the battalion in Srebrenica. The result of the
ambiguity was, as one of the military put it, that their hands were tied. Disaster was the
consequence.
The criteria used for deciding whether or not to deploy military in operations other
than war, the ‘Toetsingskader’, did serve as a bridge between the civilian-political culture
and the military culture. Politicians were, as a result of the lessons learned from Srebrenica
and the tool for political control, able to take the point of view of the military.
Parliamentarians questioned the government specifically on the points of feasibility,
clarity of the mission, participating nations, and so on. Decision-making was acknowledged
to be convergent for the expert opinions of the military were asked in the decision making
process itself. If decision making would have remained divergent, meaning that the
government decides and the military only carry out the assignment, than the gap between
the two cultures could never have been bridged.
The ‘Toetsingskader’ is used for every deployment. In the case of the deployment
in Ethiopia-Eritrea the decision making procedure contributed to an open political
debate an improved parliamentary control. By and large this mission was successful.
Parliamentary control is also strong in the case of Iraq. Here the ‘Toetsingskader’ is put to
a much more severe test. The mission is much more difficult, it being a peace enforcing
operation in unstable and risky surroundings. Participation is criticized more than in
the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Now that the mission is going on for more than half a
year, it is clear that some of the criticisms have proven their point. Iraq is riskier than
the government described it in its first letter to parliament. Progress concerning nation
building is slow. Due to differences between the rules of engagement of the occupying
countries and the non-occupying countries, these rules are not so clear as everybody
thought they were.
Iraq demonstrates that by use of a set of criteria like the ‘Toetsingskader’ a risk of
teleological reasoning is introduced. Teleological reasoning is explaining things by reference
to some purpose or end, also described as final causality, in contrast with explanation by
efficient causes only. Human conduct, insofar as it is rational, is generally explained with
reference to ends pursued9. If the government feels positively inclined to send its military
on a specific mission, there are always justifications that substantiate these inclinations.
9 www.britannica.com
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Rationalizing is one of the methods used in teleological thinking. Contributing to world
peace is always a good reason to participate in peace keeping and peace enforcing.
Juridical foundations by UN resolution are solid reasons for participating. Another
method is ignoring the facts that are bothersome to the intentions of government. It is easy
to ignore the fact that the population of Iraq is torn and divided. It is easy to ignore the fact
that this population might even be hostile towards foreign intervention because intervention
is done for the good of the Iraqi people. Classic in risk analysis is the thought that dangers
will befall on someone else. People have trouble imagining their own soldiers might be
killed as well. It might happen to the Americans, or to the Italians, but not to our own
soldiers.
Teleological reasoning, reasoning towards an end or goal, is a serious risk and the
criteria in the ‘Toetsingskader’ cannot guard us against this kind of reasoning. The criteria
have bridged the gap between two cultures. They have improved parliamentary control to
the benefit of all concerned, but they are not perfect. If governments really are fixed on
participating in a specific mission, they will always find some justification to do so. Are
new disasters lying around the corner?
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